Introduction
Peter van Inwagen rejects the dualist conception of an immaterial soul. Since there is no soul that leaves the body at the moment of death, the prospect of an afterlife will depend upon the resurrection of the dead human being. Van inwagen doubts that resurrection can occur where the dead have not been preserved in a condition nearly identical to that in which they took their last breath. He contends that even God cannot reassemble the molecules of a cremated individual in a manner that will make the miraculously assembled person one and the same as the individual cremated. Instead, it will be a qualitatively identical duplicate that God has assembled. Thus van Inwagen's religious beliefs and his materialism lead him to suggest that at the moment we die, God replaces the newly dead form with a simulacrum and stores the preserved body somewhere for the resurrection. 1 Dean Zimmerman attempts to preserve van Inwagen's materialist metaphysics with its stress on the earlier life processes immanently causing later ones, while maintaining that resurrection is possible without involving God in any "body-snatching." 2 My contention is that Zimmerman's account is metaphysically impossible. 3 The type of resurrection that Zimmerman envisions can never take place because it violates principles of part assimilation. Instead of providing a scenario where we can be resurrected, Zimmerman has merely sketched a scenario where we are duplicated.
I will begin by presenting van Inwagen's four arguments against the soul's existence. An argument adapted from Derek Parfit will be added to this list to patch up a weakness in van Inwagen's fourth argument. Next on the agenda will be an exploration of the dilemma van Inwagen presents for those of us who are materialists. Zimmerman's materialist account will be introduced as an alternative to van Inwagen's body snatching account. A discussion about how an organism assimilates new matter will follow. This discussion will provide the basis for concluding that
Zimmerman's account is metaphysically impossible. In the closing pages of the paper, I suggest that we reconsider the claim that intermittent existence without immanent biological causation is impossible. It is not impossible nor even implausible for people to exist, cease to exist, and then exist again. I will try to make readers more amenable to this position by drawing upon their intuitions that it doesn't matter what causal processes preceded their origins. Instead of being conceived when they were, they could have been conceived later, miraculously produced by God, created in an in vitro lab, or formed in a freak explosion, as long as these events bring together the same atoms in the same manner as resulted from their father's fertilization of their mother's egg. If the causal processes that bring one into existence are irrelevant to one's identity, then perhaps the causal processes that precede one's existence at a later time are also irrelevant.
Van Inwagen's Argument Against the Existence of the Soul
The first anti-dualist argument van Inwagen mentions is a familiar one -the problem of giving an adequate account of interactionism. 4 He doesn't say much on this subject, perhaps because so much has been written about it elsewhere. He observes that it isn't easy to fathom how a nonphysical, nonspatial being can interact causally with a physical thing such as the body. If dualism were true, our best theory of physical law would be incomplete because there would be physical events not caused by other physical events.
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The second defense of "soul-free" physicalism that van Inwagen offers is the "argument from common speech." We talk as if we were physical things. We say things like "she reaches for the seat belt and buckles herself in." We do not say that "she caused her body's hands to reach for the seat belt to buckle her body in." Van Inwagen concludes that this demonstrates that we conceive of ourselves as beings with physical traits, made of flesh and bone, shaped roughly like statues of human 4 beings.
Such a conception of ourselves is incompatible with the view that we are essentially immaterial souls. However, we can't put too much weight on how people talk about themselves since they are often inconsistent. Just consider how laypeople talk about what happens to them at deaththey are inconsistent as a group and often one and the same person holds inconsistent views. Such a person may speak of his grandmother ceasing to exist when a stroke causes the onset of a permanent vegetative state and the irreversible destruction of consciousness, and yet claim that she died weeks later and is buried and resting peacefully in her grave. The latter two claims suggest that people can continue to exist in mindless and even dead states. Even if people were not inconsistent, metaphysical positions are not going to be explained away by what amounts to an ordinary language analysis. I do no mean to be imputing to van Inwagen a belief that they can be so resolved. Nor do I mean to imply that he believes that the "argument from common speech" delivers a knockout blow to the opposition. Metaphysicians rarely knock out their opponents, but must settle for winning a decision on points. What van Inwagen hopes his second argument accomplishes is to merely tilt the scales in favor of his physicalist position. So van Inwagen's second argument is not pointless, nevertheless, for the reason given, it adds little weight to the physicalist side of the scale.
The third anti-dualist argument van Inwagen calls the "remote-control argument." This serves to reveal the neurological dependence of thought, a dependence that an immaterial thinking soul should not have. If dualism is true, the person's relation to his body is similar to the relationship between the operator of a remote control device and the controlled device. A blow that incapacitates the device should not affect the controller of the device. A blow to a person's head will damage the brain and the ability to control the body. But if the soul is distinct from the body, it should be a 5 witness to the events that transpire. Though the body may be unresponsive after the trauma, the soul should still be able to think throughout this period. Even if the person can't will that his body move, there is no reason why an immaterial mind shouldn't be able to recollect its thoughts from the period of physical inactivity. Van Inwagen elaborates:
The blow to the base of Alfred's skull that in fact produces unconsciousness, should according to dualism, produce the following effects on Alfred: he experiences a sharp pain at the base of his skull; he then notes that his body is falling to the floor and that it no longer responds to his will; his visual sensations and pain at the base of his skull and all the other sensations he has been experiencing fade away; and he is left, as it were, floating in the darkness, isolated, but fully conscious and able to contemplate his isolated situation and to speculate about its probable cause and its duration. But this is not what happens when one receives a blow at the base of the skull. One never finds oneself conscious but isolated from one's body. 6 This lack of mental activity suggests that the mind is not independent of the physical brain structures of the organism. More evidence of the neurological dependence of thought comes from scenarios in which human cognition undergoes impairment rather than complete cessation. Drugs, alcohol, and neurological damage all noticeably affect thought. Furthermore, the physical immaturity of the newborn's brain and the correlate lack of mental ability provides additional evidence for the neurological dependence of thought. 7 Van Inwagen realizes that such an example is not conclusive. There are responses that dualists can make to explain away the above phenomena, but these appear quite ad hoc. The believer in the soul could argue that there are thoughts during the apparent state of unconscious but they are not 6 accessible later. Or it might be argued that while the soul can survive the destruction of the body, when the body is ensouled, the person's thoughts are somehow dependent upon and restricted by the biological connections. Maybe the soul can be turned off and enter a sleep-like state, one devoid of even dreams. (Perhaps this happens to us every night.) If such a temporary "shut down" is possible, something similar could happen when a person's head is struck a powerful blow.
The "duplication argument" is the last of the four arguments, and the one van Inwagen finds "the most powerful and persuasive." Wittgenstein's words, a wheel that turns and doesn't move anything is not part of the mechanism.
To obtain this admission, van Inwagen first primes the reader by describing a sci-fi device that can scan and duplicate physical objects. Put a diamond in one chamber of the machine, and the device will produce in another chamber a perfect duplicate right down to the last quark and electron. And the machine is not limited to reproducing just static properties. Place a moving object in the appropriate chamber, and a duplicate will appear moving in the same direction with the same force. What readers each care about is not a soul, but a certain constellation of beliefs, desires, memories and the like.
The best reason we have to be ontologically committed to a theoretical entity is that it has an indispensable role in our best theory. The soul does not meet this criterion. Of course, the unimportance of the soul doesn't mean readers each lack one. Moreover, there may be other arguments that can "save the soul" without appearing to be desperation moves. I doubt that there are such arguments. However, even if I am wrong and the dualist's response is not ad hoc, the rest of the paper might still be important to such readers. This is because religious dualists may still believe in the resurrection of the body. Zimmerman explains why they should be interested in an alternative defense of materialist resurrection:
Although I tell the story under the supposition of materialism, its relevance for Christian dualists should be clear. According to venerable theological traditions, Christ, like all of us, was a spirit united to a normal human body. After his body was killed, he (i.e., his spirit, since his body was still in the tomb) descended into hell to "preach to the spirits in prison" and "lead forth captives." On "the third day," his body was raised to life again -that very same body that lay in the tomb was reanimated by his spirit and subtly transformed. Identity of the dying and resurrected body is necessary to make sense of the empty tomb. And if Christ's death and resurrection provide the model for our own, it would be a great theological advantage to be able to say that we, too, get numerically the same body back -transformed and improved, no doubt, but not a body newly cut from wholly different cloth. The Christian dualist moved by these theological considerations can put the theory that follows into service as an account of one way in which our resurrected bodies could be the same as the bodies we had in this life, in much the same sense in which Christ's resurrected body was the same as the one laid in the tomb.
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Van Inwagen's Account of Resurrection
Van Inwagen doubts that resurrection can occur where the dead human being has not been preserved in a condition nearly identical to that in which it took its last breath. Even God cannot reassemble the molecules of a cremated individual in a manner that will make the miraculously assembled person identical to the individual cremated. Van Inwagen, of course, acknowledges that it is within God's power to reassemble all the atoms of someone destroyed through cremation, explosion, or ordinary graveyard decay. But he insists that the resulting being would be someone else -a duplicate of the man who died and not the dead person restored to life.
Why is God unable to resurrect a destroyed being whose parts have been scattered? Van
Inwagen's reasoning is that God's gathering of scattered human particles would mean that a miraculous force rather than the essential life processes of the organism is responsible for the location and organization of the constituent matter of the life. Van Inwagen insists that an organism at one time is identical to an organism at another time only if there is the proper biological continuity linking the two. The organism's parts must be caught up in the same life processes and these life processes must be responsible for the role and position of the parts. Since such processes are absent from miraculous reassembly, this makes God's deed a duplication rather than a resurrection of the original life.
14 Van Inwagen illustrates his claim with the analogy of an artwork. 15 God can no more restore the cremated human being to life than he can restore an artist's sculpture that was melted or beaten down into a lump. The artwork's identity depends upon its causal origins -the intentions and the actions of the sculptor that give each piece of clay its shape and position. The artist's handiwork individuates the artwork, makes it the artwork it is and numerically distinguishes it from other 12 qualitatively identical artworks. What matters to the survival of the artwork is not just that the parts of it are at a later time where they were once before, but how they got there. According to van Inwagen, whether it be a freak storm, another man, or even God which destroys the sculpture and then reassembles each molecule of clay to where it was before, the original artist would be wrong to see this reassembled sculpture as his own handiwork. He is not responsible for this new creation. It is not his artwork, for its matter is not positioned by his hand. And likewise, van Inwagen concludes, even God cannot reassemble numerically the same human being. Just at the artwork needed to have its arrangement of parts caused by the artist, a living human being needs the arrangement of its particles to be caused by biological forces.
I do not think the artwork example will support van Inwagen's thesis. 16 Consider a sculpture made in a studio of a master sculptor. The apprentice of the master places each piece of clay in a position at the direction of the master. Who is the art work's creator? I tend to think that it is just the master unless the apprentice is doing something highly skilled. 17 Even in the latter case, my judgement would be that the sculpture is a co-creation rather than the artistic creation solely of the apprentice. If the master can create or co-create an artwork that another assembles, why can he not be rightly considered the creator or co-creator of a statue that results from others reassembling the clay of his now destroyed statue, if they do so in accordance with the intentions that he originally conveyed to his apprentice? Perhaps we should see the product of the second assembly as numerically identical to the first one completed by the dutiful apprentice. Thus such a sculpture could have a "gappy" or scattered existence.
Why not view God's activity as analogous to the directions the master sculptor gave to the apprentice? God could be understood as the "original artist" who created the world and arranged its to identity is that a human being's parts are where they are due to the continual biological processes of the organism rather than some other cause such as God's miraculous tracking and reassembling of matter that has long ceased to be caught up in any life processes. This still leaves body snatching as the materialist view in the absence of an alternative conception.
Zimmerman's Materialist Alternative
Zimmerman believes he has a materialist alternative to the body-snatching of van Inwagen. It can meet van Inwagen's demand for immanent causation which entails that the parts, states and 14 processes of the organism be caused by the previous parts, states and processes of that organism. He offers the following description of how God may resurrect the human body:
If we can make sense of immanent-causal connections over spatiotemporal gaps, then we are well on our way to an account of survival without body-snatching. Suppose my body were to go undergo an extraordinary and discontinuous case of fission: every particle in my body at a certain time t is immanent-causally connected with two resulting particle-stages after that time. The two sets of resulting particles appear at some later time t* in disjointed spatial regions, and each is arranged just as the set of "parent" particles that produced it; what's more, they are so arranged because the original particles were so arranged -for each particle produces its "offspring" at precisely the same distances and directions as every other particle, insuring duplication of my body's overall structure. My body, in this case, replicates itself over a temporal gap. Given the solution to fission cases advocated above, we must say that this event brings my life to an end. But now suppose that the same sort of fissioning of each particle occurs, but that only one set constitutes at t* a living human body structured just like mine; the other set appears at t* as an unstructured pile of dead matter. Perhaps many of the particles that appear on one side are not arranged just like the original set of particles. Then, thanks to the failure of one body to "take," my life is continued by the successful candidate that appears after a temporal interval...Now we have a model for how God may resurrect this very body: He does so by, just before it completely loses its living form, enabling each particle to divide -or at least be immanent-causally responsible for two resulting particle-stages.
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15 So Zimmerman's position is that half of the resulting particles will compose a corpse that remains here on earth, and the other particles will compose a living organism that shows up in Heaven, perhaps much later. Zimmerman allows a gap between death and resurrection in the being's existence as long as there is still immanent causality, i.e., between death and resurrection, there is no other causal source sufficient for reassembling the atoms into a living being. This rules out Star Trek teletransporters and God reassembling an individual's parts. 19 Zimmerman insists that on his account, which is a form of closest continuer theory, there is no danger of an individual "fissioning out of existence" because only one aggregate of particles composes a living being, the other ends up a lifeless corpse. So there is no competition between the two products of fission over which is identical to the being that gave rise to them both. The dying individual immanently causes and thus survives as the being in Heaven. 
The Nature of Part Assimilation
We human organisms replace all of our matter over time. But this replacement must happen in a certain manner for us to survive it. A number of thought experiments will serve to elicit the reader's beliefs about the metaphysical rules governing part replacement. Consider the sci-fi scenario of an organism being cryogenically frozen. Can it survive part replacement while it is in a deep freeze in which no life processes such as metabolism and homeostasis occur? Assume that the technology exists to remove and then replace every molecule with a new molecule. This process could take as long or as short a time as the reader likes. The new parts have never been caught up in any life processes because the exchange took place in such extremely cold temperatures. They have not been biologically assimilated by the individual's body as were the parts they replaced. 21 The new particles never circulated in his blood, never were caught up in his metabolism, never were involved in homeostatic processes etc. Would it be the same dead body? I expect that a number of readers will share my doubts that it is the same body.
Those readers who don't share such doubts should imagine a scenario in which perverse morgue workers add so much dead tissue to a corpse that they cause the dead body to double in size.
Since they are perverse, they even attach other appendages to it. Would readers think it was the same body? More readers will now say no, but others may not know what to say and thus will be led to conclude that the matter is indeterminate. But contrast these reactions with the complete absence of doubt that a living organism could survive the gradual change of all its parts and would be the same organism even if it doubled in size and even grew an eleventh finger and a third arm. The living organism survives such change because it properly assimilates the new particles of matter by having them caught up in its life processes.
As long as part replacement does not happen too quickly and the replacement parts are not too large, the result should be metaphysically and biologically acceptable. But why, the reader might ask, does the speed or size of the part replacement matter? The key lies in the concept of "assimilation" 
Why Zimmerman's Two Solutions Fail
If the outlined account of part replacement is correct, then it won't do us much good if God causes all of our particles to fission right before death. The result won't lead to any of us ending up in
Heaven. There are two problems with Zimmerman's alternative "solution" to the dilemma that van
Inwagen outlines. The first and less metaphysically troubling one is that the corpse on earth and the body in Heaven suddenly appear with twice the matter that a being emerging from fission should have. Fissioning standardly gives rise to a pair of new entities that are one half the size of their immediate ancestor. Since the corpse is the same size as the being that was dying, if it is a result of fission, then half of its matter is new. That would be a major problem if the dying organism was the same individual being as the corpse, but there is no such identity on Zimmerman's account. An organism is essentially alive. Corpses are the remains of organisms, not later stages of them. The real problem is that if the resurrected being is the same size as the dying individual, then it instantaneously doubled in size after the fissioning process ended. This new matter wasn't properly assimilated. To avoid this difficulty, Zimmerman could perhaps claim that we start out in Heaven half the size we were at our dying moments. However, there is a second difficulty regarding assimilation that prevents even this claim from being a materialist solution to the problem of resurrection.
This second problem will make the body in Heaven a duplicate rather than a later stage of the dying individual here on earth. The parts of the heavenly body, even if these consisted of only one half of those of the pre-fissioned individual, were never properly assimilated into an existing body.
While the heavenly individual's particles were caused by the dying individual's particles, they never were caught up any life processes with the older particles. The new particles never composed any cells, tissues and organs with the older particles; they never combined with any of the older particles to form part of any skeletal structures; and they were never involved in any metabolic or homeostatic processes with the already existing particles. Contrast this with the normal bodily assimilation of new matter and the loss of old. The organism eats, drinks and breathes in new particles that get caught up in life processes with some old particles while other particles that were already part of the organism are exhaled, excreted and perspired. There is an overlap of the new and the old, and this enables the new particles, to be assimilated into the individual's body. It is helpful to contrast normal cell division in a human being with the total fissioning of every particle that Zimmerman hypothesizes. It would be a mistake to think that the problem of assimilation can be avoided by a second process of resurrection that Zimmerman considers. Instead of fissioning, the particles of the dying, when zapped by God, each immanently cause two particles to arise. Half of all the immanently caused particles are the constituents of the corpse and the other half end up composing the resurrected individual in Heaven. Recall the earlier Zimmerman quote in which it was claimed that God can resurrect a body "by, just before it completely loses its living form, enabling each particle to divideor at least be immanent-causally responsible for two resulting particle-stages." 22 
I take it that what
Zimmerman means by the second option is that when God zaps the body and every particle immanently causes two particles, one particle is just a later stage of the particle that immanently causes it, while the other is a different particle. Zimmerman explains: "Each particle x is immanentcausally connected to two streams of later particle-stages; one of them -the one in the here and nowincludes stages of x itself; the other, one in the hereafter, consists of stages of a different particle."
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Since there isn't any fissioning, there is no problem of a body being the same size as the prefissioned individual despite only receiving half of its matter. But this second type of divinely motivated immanent causation will still violate principles of assimilation. The new, non-fissioned produced particles were never assimilated with the old in any life processes. The particles of the dying individual never combined with the new particles to compose any tissues or skeletal structures. The new particles never interacted with the preexisting particles to bring oxygen to any part of the body, to heal a wound or fight an infection, nor did they ever participate together in any processes of metabolism or homeostasis or excretion. Thus the new particles that compose the allegedly resurrected being never were parts of the body of the dying person. So again, the principle of assimilation is violated, and Zimmerman has provided us with an account of duplication rather than resurrection. The entity in Heaven is a clone of the deceased and thus Zimmerman's account provides us with no more immortality than that which comes from an identical twin surviving our death. And whatever consolation that may give us as we are dying, it is not a case of true immortality. It should not be thought that the identity claims in the above passage are only plausible because the entity discussed is a one cell organism of the type that we all originate from. A similar point could be made with a complex organism rather than a zygote. God could have brought you into existence just a split second ago complete with "quasi-memories" of having lived for decades. God also could have had you originate two days from now. Consider the possibility that God destroys you a moment after creating you and then two days later, at the exact time that God could have originally brought you into existence, He reassembles your parts exactly as they were at the time he destroyed you. I find it difficult to believe that this is a duplicate rather than you, especially when we have already established you could have been brought into existence in that condition and at that moment for the first time. Can it really matter if at that later time the assembled entity is not biologically continuous with you from your origin? There would have been no physical change between the two beings because you were destroyed an instant after being created.
The Essentiality of Origins and the Possibility of Intermittent Existence
I hope these considerations make intermittent existence appear more plausible. If the causal processes that first brought us into existence are not essential to our identity, then perhaps the causal processes that precede the reassembly of the matter we had at the time of our death are also irrelevant to questions of identity. However, there are philosophers who will dispute the claim that the causal processes which first brought us into existence are metaphysically unimportant. They will insist that we had to come from the actual sperm and egg that we did. 26 If it was necessary that we emerged from the biological process of fertilization out of which we did in fact develop, then it would follow that the timing and process that culminated with our coming into existence are not as metaphysically unimportant as I suggest. If our origins could not have been different than they were, then no modal facts about the nature of our origins could be used to analogously support the claim that we could be resurrected after our deaths, regardless of what happens to our bodies in the interim period. This would prevent me from arguing that what happens to our bodies between the time of death and when our matter is reassembled by God is as unimportant to the question of our resurrection as the prior history of the matter that first composed us is to the possibility of our initially coming into existence.
My opponents might insist that we necessarily would not exist in the absence of the biological process of fertilization, just as van Inwagen and Zimmerman claim that it would be impossible for the deceased to come back to life in the absence of certain biological processes causing the body parts of the dead to be where they were .
While I agree with many essentialists about the necessity of our possessing (most of) our original matter, I don't find the above claim about the fertilization process convincing. 27 It is not metaphysically important where and in what form was our original matter before it first came to compose us. To better appreciate this point, the reader should imagine that the matter that first 24 constituted her was once cosmic dust floating near the moon that later came to earth and found its way into the food chain and ended up completely composing the reader at her origins. Surely, where that matter once was doesn't have any bearing on her identity. She could just as well have originated when she did if that dust had never been in the vicinity of the moon but was always earthbound and ended up in the food chain. I don't see any reason to treat gametes differently from the dust floating by the moon. Both involve the location and arrangement of matter prior to it coming to compose the reader.
Why then do people so adamantly insist that it is necessary that we come from the gametes that we did? 28 One explanation is that they are misled by thought experiments similar to those typically given for the essentiality of origins. 29 Such thought experiments usually take something like the following form. If it wasn't essential that the reader develop from the gametes that she did in the actual world (W 1 ), then there could be a second world (W 2 ) in which she develops from different gametes. There could also be a third world (W 3 ) in which the gametes she emerged from in W 1 coexist with the pair of gametes she developed from in W 2 . 30 In this third world, both pairs of gametes give rise to different human beings. Which human being would the reader be? Since there is a world in which the reader comes from one pair of gametes, and another world in which the reader emerges from the other pair, it would seem then that either pair could give rise to the reader if the other didn't coexist with it in W 3 . So the identity of the person that the gametes give rise to depends upon the existence of what other distinct things are present. Making the identity of an entity depend upon what is extrinsic to it is quite problematic.
The dilemma posed by this third world will lead many philosophers to conclude that the reader couldn't arise from the fusion of the second pair of gametes in W 2 or W 3 if in W 1 she arose 25 from the merging of the first pair. That may be true, but this doesn't mean that the reader could only emerge in W 3 (or any other world) from the fusion of the first gamete pair. It isn't important to our identity that those gametes existed. What is essential is only that the matter contained in them was later arranged in the way that it was at the time of our origins in the actual world. As argued earlier, it isn't important if our originating matter composed a pair of gametes. In fact, even if the gametes that the reader emerged from in the actual world (W 1 ) existed in (W 3 ), she could come to exist in that world without emerging from the fertilization of that egg by that sperm. One way for this to happen is that the gametes fail to fuse and give rise to any entity physically indistinguishable from the embryo that the reader developed from in the actual world (W 1 ). The gametes could then be destroyed and their constitutive matter later gathered and arranged just as it was in W 1 at the moment when fertilization was completed.
A second reason some philosophers may mistakenly maintain that we must necessarily come from the sperm and egg that we actually did is that they believe we are essentially members of the species Homo sapiens and such species membership is a historical property. 31 It is commonplace for contemporary philosophers of biology to treat a species as a historical individual, not a kind. Having a certain ancestry and being a member of a reproductive community is more important than morphological similarity for determining our species membership. Without being reproductively linked to a certain population we could not be a member of that species. A duplicate of the reader on a distant planet wouldn't belong to the same species because of its different history. Or if a doppelganger of the reader arose as a swamp embryo in a freak explosion (apologies to Davidson), it wouldn't belong to the reader's species. If our species membership is essential to us, then it might be thought that we necessarily had to have the historical origins that we did. We must belong to a particular reproductive community, sharing certain ancestors. And our link to that common ancestry is through the gametes we receive from our parents.
I am willing to accept that species are historical individuals and not kinds. But I doubt it is true that species membership is essential to each of us. To see this, the reader should imagine that everyone in her city or county undergoes a mutation and can no longer reproduce with anyone from any other geographic region. This reproductively isolated population will constitute a new species.
But then the reader has switched species. If species membership is an essential trait, the reader could not survive such a change. But it is preposterous to think that a change in the reproductive capacities of an individual could destroy it and bring into existence a new individual. The doctrine that species membership is essential to our persistence would be further undermined if there has to be several generations of reproductive isolation before it is a fact that a new species has arisen. Species membership would then be a relational property that one could acquire long after one's death. It is not at all plausible to claim that one can acquire essential properties after ceasing to exist.
I hope the arguments of the last few pages make intermittent existence appear more plausible.
If species membership is not essential to an individual, then we have further reason to believe that any historical factors that contributed to one's emergence are not essential. If the causal processes that bring one into existence are not essential to one's identity, then perhaps the causal processes that precede one's existence at a later time are likewise irrelevant. Thus immanent causation would not be necessary to our resurrection. What is essential is that (most of) the matter which composes one at the last moment of one's existence is so arranged in much the same way at the next moment of one's existence. If that condition is met, even if it is accomplished by God's miraculous intervention, then the same individual exists who existed earlier. 
